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CLIMATE, CONFLICT AND SOCIETY: CHANGING RESPONSES TO WEATHER EXTREMES IN 
NINETEENTH CENTURY ZULULAND 
 
Abstract:  Changing climates affect human societies differently depending on societal 
structures, cultural perceptions and their relative vulnerability and resilience. In this study, we 
explore the complex relationship between climate, conflict and society in nineteenth century 
Zululand. The paper first reviews current debates surrounding the links between climatic 
change, societal transformation and the rise of the Zulu Kingdom from the late-eighteenth to 
early-nineteenth centuries. It then considers new empirical evidence relating to conflict and 
socio-economic changes at a local scale in Zululand from the early-mid-nineteenth century 
onwards, using a combination of unpublished archival materials written by missionaries and 
other observers, together with oral histories and traditions. Our analysis highlights how 
changing precipitation patterns, especially towards drier conditions, may have contributed to 
changes in societal responses, including dominant narratives about rain-control, the migration 
and dissolution of society, and conflicts and unrest. We suggest that temporal differences in 
these responses were contingent upon the role of leaders, power structures, and the 
willingness and ability of leaders to yield this power. The case of nineteenth century Zululand 
exemplifies the complexity of environment-society interactions, and strengthens the call for a 
thorough scrutiny of the narratives of social unrest in specific socio-cultural contexts. 
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Introduction: Social unrest and climate 
The relationship between climate and society – both today and in history – has been a source 
of debate within academia and policy circles for a considerable time. In the latter arena, it has 
been suggested that there is a strong relationship between changing climate, especially 
towards drier conditions, and increased levels of social unrest and conflict. The assumption of 
a strong link between climate change and conflict was most clearly manifested in the joint 
award of the 2007 Nobel peace prize to Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). The rationale for the award, made with direct reference to the Sahel region, 
was that global warming fuelled violence and conflict. More recently, UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon has claimed that there is a strong connection between global warming and the 
Darfur conflict, while suggestions of a link between drought and the ongoing Syrian civil war 
have received widespread publicity.1 
According to Gemenne et al., this way of thinking is part of a neo-environmental deterministic 
narrative that explains societal change as a direct function of environmental drivers (see also 
arguments by Homer-Dixon). There is, however, very little scientific consensus on the 
connection between climate change and social unrest, and researchers disagree on both the 
statistical correlations and causal dynamics of such claims. Hsiang et al., for example, argue 
that natural climate cycles of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation may have a significant influence 
on war and peace around the Equator, with tropical countries facing double the risk of armed 
conflict and civil war during warm, and in many areas of the tropics, dry, El Niño years than 
during cooler La Niña phases. Adano et al. and Butler and Gates, in contrast, suggest from 
studies in East Africa that conflicts and killings, typically over water and/or grazing rights, tend 
to increase in periods of plentiful rainfall. Hendrix and Salehyan further argue that rainfall 
deviation in either direction may trigger inter-communal conflict, while Gleditsch concludes 
that there is little evidence that long-term climate change or short-term climate variability has 
had any observable effects on global patterns of conflict.2  
From these brief examples, it is clear that more detailed analyses of past conflicts are required 
to understand the complex relationships between the multiple factors, including climate 
change/variability, which can lead to social unrest. Human responses to climate variability 
                                                          
1 For discussion of climate-society interactions in academic and policy circles see Simon Dalby, ‘Climate 
Change: The New Dimensions of Environmental Security’, The RUSI Journal 158 (2013): 34-43. For a 
discussion on conflict and climate in the Sahel, see Hugo Verhoeven, ‘Climate Change, Conflict and 
Development in Sudan: Global Neo-Malthusian Narratives and Local Power Struggles’, Development 
and Change 42 (2011): 679–707; Tor Benjaminsen et al., ‘Does climate change drive land-use conflicts 
in the Sahel?’, Journal of Peace Research, 49 (2012): 97-111. For drought and conflict in Syria, see Peter 
Gleick, ‘Water, drought, climate change, and conflict in Syria’, Weather, Climate and Society 6 (2014): 
331-340; Colin Kelley et al., ‘Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian 
drought’, PNAS, 112 (2015): 3241-3246. 
2 François Gemenne et al., ‘Climate and security: evidence, emerging risks, and a new agenda’, 
Climatic Change 123 (2014): 1-9. Thomas Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental scarcities and violent 
conflict: Evidence from cases’, International security 19 (1994): 5-40. Solomon Hsiang et al., ’Civil 
conflicts are associated with the global climate’, Nature 476 (2011): 438–441; Warrio Adano et al., 
‘Climate change, violent conflict and local institutions in Kenya’s drylands’, Journal of Peace Research 
49 (2012): 65-80; Christopher Butler and Scott Gates, ‘African range wars: Climate, conflict and 
property rights’, Journal of Peace Research 49 (2012): 23-34; Cullen Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, 
‘Climate Change, rainfall, and social conflict in Africa’, Journal of Peace Research 49, (2012), 35-50. 
Nils Gleditsch, ’whither the weather? Climate change and conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 49 
(2012): 3-9. 
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may feed into ecological systems, producing any number of multidirectional effects in both 
time and space. As Costanza et al. illustrate, extreme drought might trigger both societal 
‘collapse’ and the inventive management of water through irrigation. Furthermore, as 
highlighted by Endfield, changing climate affects human societies differently depending on the 
prevailing social structures and hierarchies, and their relative resilience and vulnerability. 
Butzer notes that to understand how, for instance, harvest failures lead to social unrest and 
conflict, we need to look at the linkages between historical, cultural, political and demographic 
factors within specific localities, and particularly the roles of leaders, elites and ideology, 
before we can explain any causality. Different societies may respond to climate stresses in 
different ways. Coombes and Barber argue, for example, that major events do not always 
require major causes, and that, in marginal areas, only slight environmental changes might 
have significant impacts on the resource base. Understanding how human-environment 
systems have operated through history might further benefit decision-making within 
contemporary society, and may go some way towards challenging mono-causal explanations 
and oversimplified correlations. As Butzer and Endfield note, an emphasis on complexity is 
important, and historical examples must be treated with caution to avoid simple cause-effect 
relationships with respect to the societal effects of predicted environmental scenarios. 
According to Butzer, the issue is “not whether climatic change is relevant for socio-historical 
change, but how we can deal more objectively with coupled systems that include a great 
tapestry of variables, among which climatically triggered environmental change is undeniably 
important”.3  
The historical case of nineteenth century Zululand 
In this paper, we examine the case of nineteenth century Zululand – now part of present-day 
KwaZulu-Natal province, South Africa (figure 1.) – in order to understand how historical 
evidence from this region and period can shed light on the relationship between climate 
variability and social unrest. Specifically, we explore the impacts of droughts, and how they 
may or may not be linked to conflict and social unrest at the local level. The choice of Zululand 
for this study is based on three considerations. First, the region underwent a series of major 
social, economic and political changes during the 1800s; these included periods of mass 
migration, state formation and transformations in political power of both indigenous and 
colonial origin, in many cases accompanied by widespread unrest and conflict (see for instance 
Guy and Wright). Second, the climatic background against which these changes occurred is 
unusually well-resolved through a combination of dendroclimatological and documentary-
based rainfall reconstructions (see Nash et al.). Third, Zululand is a region for which a 
significant body of historical documentary and oral material exists, particularly from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards, allowing for careful cross-referencing of potential causal 
linkages. The richness and continuity of these materials, therefore, permits us to explore 
climate-society relationships in far greater detail than the late-eighteenth/early-nineteenth 
                                                          
3 Robert Costanza et al., ‘Sustainability or Collapse: What Can We Learn from Integrating the History 
of Humans and the Rest of Nature?’, Ambio 36 (2007): 522-527. Georgina Endfield, ‘The resilience 
and adaptive capacity of social-environmental systems in colonial Mexico’, PNAS 109 (2012): 3676-
3681. Karl Butzer, ‘Collapse, environment, and society’, PNAS 109 (2012): 3632-3639. Paul Coombes 
and Keith Barber, ‘Environmental determinism in Holocene research: causality or coincidence?’, Area 
37 (2005): 303-311. Karl Butzer and Georgina Endfield, ‘Critical perspectives on historical collapse’, 
PNAS 109 (2012): 3628-3631. Karl Butzer, ’Collapse, environment, and society,’ PNAS, 109 (2012): 
3633-3639. 
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century timeframe of the majority of historical studies in the region (e.g. Ballard and 
Eldredge).4 
Figure 1: Map showing key locations referred to in the text against present-day boundaries of 
KwaZulu-Natal province, South Africa. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four main sections. After a summary of historical 
sources and methods, we review debates surrounding the relationship between climate 
                                                          
4 Jeff Guy, ‘Ecological factors in the rise of Shaka and the Zulu Kingdom’, in Shula Marks & Anthony 
Atmore (eds.), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, pp. 102-119 (London: Longman 
Group, 1980); John Wright, ‘Turbulent times. Political transformation in the North and East’, in 
Carolyn Hamilton et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol. 1. From the Early Times to 
1885, pp. 211-252 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). David Nash et al., ‘Annual and 
seasonal rainfall variability in southeast Africa during the nineteenth century reconstructed from 
documentary sources’ Climatic Change, 134 (2016): 605–619. Charles Ballard, ‘Drought and Economic 
Distress: South Africa in the 1800s’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 17 (1986): 359-387; 
Elizabeth Eldredge, ‘Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa, c. 1800–30: The ‘Mfecane’ Reconsidered’, 
Journal of African History 33 (1992): 1-35. Elizabeth Eldredge, The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom, 
1815-1828: War, Shaka and the Consolidation of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
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variability and the formation of the Zulu Kingdom – the polity of primary interest in this article 
– in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, drawing mainly upon previously 
published material. We then consider new empirical evidence relating to conflict, socio-
economic changes and responses to rainfall extremes in Zululand from the early-mid-
nineteenth century onwards; this is mostly derived from unpublished archival material written 
by missionaries and other pre-colonial and colonial observers, and to a lesser extent, oral 
histories and traditions. Our focus in this section is on small scale, internal conflicts and unrest 
within the Zulu Kingdom, as opposed to larger scale external wars (e.g. with the British, 
Voortrekkers or Swazi), since the latter often have wider political-economic explanations 
strongly linked to colonial expansion and/or control. By focusing on local, internal conflicts in 
relation to climate variability, we thus aim to disentangle the causal chains between climatic 
events and social unrest by identifying: (i) how climate extremes affected people within the 
Zulu Kingdom, (ii) how these events were interpreted culturally, and (iii) the various responses 
they engendered. We conclude with a discussion of the complex linkages between climate 
variability, unrest and conflict in nineteenth century Zululand, and point to directions for 
future historical climate-conflict research. 
Historical sources and methodology 
The empirical materials used for this investigation were compiled as part of one of three case 
studies within the larger project "Societal responses to El Niño-related climate extremes in 
southern Africa." Historical collections relating to nineteenth century Zululand and adjacent 
areas of the former Natal Province were scrutinised in ten different archives in Germany, 
Norway, South Africa, the UK and the USA (Table I). The collections included English-, German- 
and Norwegian-language materials written mainly by missionaries, explorers, farmers and 
other colonists, representatives of colonial authorities, and journalists. The range of materials 
consulted included published sources, such as historical books, travelogues and newspapers, 
as well as extensive unpublished collections of letters, reports, journals, personal papers and 
weather diaries. 
Table I: Details of main archival collections consulted for former Zululand and Natal. 
Name of archive                                                              Key collections consulted Coding 
used in 
endnotes 
National Archives, London  Nineteenth century British Colonial 
Office materials 
n/a 
British Library, London  Nineteenth century 
monographs/travelogues 
n/a 
Rhodes House (Bodleian Library), 
University of Oxford  
Society for the Propagation of the 
Gospel materials for 1853 onwards 
USPG 
Royal Commonwealth Society 
Library, University of Cambridge  
Official ‘Blue Books’ and related 
statistical data 
n/a 
National Library of Scotland, 
Edinburgh  
Church of Scotland Board of World 
Mission collection containing 
materials for 1889 onwards 
NLS 
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Evangelisch-lutherisches 
Missionswerk Niedersachsen, 
Archiv, Hermannsburg, Germany  
Hermannsburg Lutheran Missionary 
Society materials for 1854 onwards 
ELM 
Norwegian Mission Society archive, 
Stavanger, Norway  
Norwegian Mission Society materials 
for 1840 onwards 
MHS 
Houghton Library, Harvard 
University, USA  
American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions papers for 1835 
onwards 
ABC 
Msunduzi Municipal Library, 
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa  
Collections of nineteenth century 
books and newspapers, including the 
full run of the Natal Witness from 
1846 to 1900  
n/a 
Killie Campbell Africana Library, 
Durban, South Africa  
Books, manuscripts and diaries 
relating to Zululand and Natal during 
the nineteenth century 
KCAL 
 
Documents from each of the collections were analysed systematically, drawing upon 
methodologies established in previous research into southern African climate history by 
Endfield and Nash. Individual items were scrutinised for accounts of climate-related 
conditions and any associated societal impacts and responses. These were recorded verbatim 
and, where necessary, transcribed into English. For the purposes of this study, the most 
important societal observations included commentaries on customs and beliefs, local and/or 
regional population dispersal, social unrest, local and more widespread conflict, and climatic 
narratives. In total, 7220 individual quotations spanning the period 1836-1900 were 
transcribed and entered into a custom built database. This permitted historical information to 
be sorted geographically and chronologically to facilitate the identification of spatial or 
temporal variations.5 
The most valuable material for exploring the linkages between climatic variability, social 
unrest and conflict came from the writings of missionaries. Although there are mentions of 
other polities, much of this material focusses upon observations of, and interactions with, 
people residing under Zulu authority; this emphasis shapes the narratives within this paper. 
The first mission stations in the region were established near Port Natal (now Durban) in 1836 
by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, with inland locations in 
Zululand following shortly (see Lulat). Other mission stations were established from the early-
1840s by organisations including the Norwegian Mission Society, Hermannsburg Missionary 
Society and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. Many missionaries lived in rural 
areas for several years and sometimes decades. They were, therefore, in a unique position to 
                                                          
5 For more on the methodology employed, see Georgina Endfield and David Nash, ‘Missionaries and 
morals: climatic discourse in nineteenth-century central Southern Africa,’ Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 92 (2002): 727-742; Georgina Endfield and David Nash, ‘Drought, desiccation 
and discourse: missionary correspondence and nineteenth-century climate change in central 
southern Africa’, Geographical Journal, 168 (2002): 33-47; David Nash and Georgina Endfield, ‘A 19th 
century climate chronology for the Kalahari region of central southern Africa derived from missionary 
correspondence’, International Journal of Climatology 22 (2002): 821-841; David Nash and Georgina 
Endfield 'Splendid rains have fallen: links between El Niño and rainfall variability in the Kalahari, 
1840-1900’, Climatic Change 86 (2008): 257-290. 
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report on weather extremes, changes in local climate, social-political organisation and 
conflicts over longer timespans. In many areas, their accounts of local customs, traditions and 
land-use strategies provide the only written insight into rural daily life and its interaction with 
climatic variability. However, when interpreting missionary materials, the positionality of the 
writer and their intended audience must be taken into consideration. Indeed, although many 
of the missionaries became well accustomed to, and partly integrated into, local conditions, 
they nonetheless remained ‘outside’ observers.6  
Historical documentary sources were supplemented by examination of predominantly Zulu 
oral histories and traditions compiled within the James Stuart Archive. This published 
collection of oral material consists of recorded interviews conducted by James Stuart, a Zulu 
interpreter, clerk to the Resident Commissioner, and Chief Magistrate in Pietermaritzburg 
between the 1890s and 1920s. Stuart’s interest in Zulu history emerged from his need to 
understand the cultural contexts and practices relevant to the court cases he administered, 
and over the course of his time in Natal, Zululand and Swaziland, he interviewed over 150 men 
and a handful of women at his home. The eldest of these interviewees had personal memories 
of Shaka and the events that took place during his rule (see below), though most were born 
after this time and their testimonies thus relate to the mid-late-nineteenth century. As with 
the documentary sources, the oral evidence is permeated by exaggeration and fictional 
elements. As Eldredge notes, however, Stuart was scrupulous in the recording of this 
evidence, particularly in the presence of third parties, recorded what he believed were 
exaggerations as emphasis rather than fact, and questioned inconsistency where it was 
present. Oral evidence on customs, beliefs and climatic narratives therefore provides an 
important corroborative resource for the far greater volume of European sources.7  
Climate, conflict and state formation in early-nineteenth century Zululand 
A number of scholars have considered the interaction between climate and conflict in early-
nineteenth century Zululand. Attention has focussed in particular on the role of climatic 
change and drought in the intensification of conflict and migration that affected much of 
southeast Africa at this time, as well as on the formation of the Zulu kingdom under its 
renowned ruler, Shaka, during the second decade of the nineteenth century.8 These events 
                                                          
6 For more details on the establishment of the different mission stations, see Y.G.-M Lulat, United 
States relations with South Africa: a critical overview from the colonial period to the present (New 
York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008);  Frederick Hale, Norwegian missionaries in Natal and Zululand: 
selected correspondence 1844-1900 (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1997); Ernst-August 
Lüdemann, (ed.) Vision: Gemeinde weltweit - 150 Jahre Hermannsburger Mission und Ev. Luth. 
Missionswerk in Niedersachsen (Hermannsburg: Verlag der Missionshandlung, 2000); Charles Pascoe, 
Two hundred years of the SPG: an historical account of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
in Foreign Parts, 1701-1900 (London:  Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 1901). 
7 Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence relating to 
the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples, 6 vols. (Durban: Killie Campbell Africana Library, 
1976-2014). Elizabeth Eldredge, Kingdoms and Chiefdoms of Southeastern Africa: Oral Traditions and 
History, 1400-1830 (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2015). 
8 See Charles Ballard, ‘Drought and Economic Distress: South Africa in the 1800s’, The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 17 (1986): 359-387; Elizabeth Eldredge, ‘Sources of Conflict in Southern 
Africa, c. 1800–30: The ‘Mfecane’ Reconsidered’, Journal of African History 33 (1992): 1-35; Thomas 
Huffman, ‘The archaeology of the Nguni past’, Southern African Humanities 16 (2004): 79-111; Karin 
Holmgren and Helena Öberg, ‘Climate change in southern and eastern Africa during the past 
millennium and its implications for societal development’, Environment, Development and 
Sustainability 8 (2006): 185-195; Matthew Hannaford et al., ‘Early-nineteenth-century southern 
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and the debate over climatic agency have been discussed at length elsewhere,9 though some 
background is necessary here if we are to contextualise the investigation of later-nineteenth 
century responses to rainfall extremes that follows. 
The Zulu kingdom: origins and formation (1760s-1818) 
Prior to the late-eighteenth century, archaeological records and sporadic written accounts 
from shipwrecked Portuguese, inform us that socio-political organisation across what came to 
be known as Zululand took the form of a number of relatively fluid, small-scale chiefdoms, 
each bound together by ritual practices, acts of allegiance and the redistribution of cattle from 
the chief to politically important followers. By the time detailed written accounts emerge from 
the region in the 1820s, however, the situation had changed dramatically. This was most 
clearly illustrated by the growth of inequality – both within chiefdoms through increased 
economic and social stratification, and between chiefdoms in terms of enlarged differences in 
territorial extent, population, and cattle holdings.10 
In the Zululand area, the Ndwandwe under Zwide, the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo and the 
Qwabe under Phakathwayo had become the dominant chiefdoms by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, while many smaller groups had fragmented or become incorporated into 
these larger polities. The success of these rulers was based in large part on the restructuring 
of the former military units of different lineages into unified age-graded groups termed 
amabutho; a system that perhaps partially emerged in response to competition over new 
trade opportunities at Delagoa Bay during the late-eighteenth century. This new system of 
social organisation weakened the influence of territorially based kinship relations and allowed 
for the subordination – both militarily and diplomatically – of smaller neighbouring 
chiefdoms.11 In order to maintain and expand political power, ruling houses levied increased 
demands of cattle tribute upon individual homesteads, and as the need to replace cattle grew, 
so did cattle raiding. Indeed, Wright explains that raiding acquired a new dynamic in the early-
nineteenth century with the rise of amabutho-based polities, and this eventually grew into 
full-scale conflict to accumulate more grazing land, as well as cattle itself.12 
                                                          
African precipitation reconstructions from ships' logbooks’, The Holocene, 25 (2015): 379-390; 
Matthew Hannaford and David Nash, ‘Climate, history, society over the last millennium in southeast 
Africa’ WIREs Climate Change, 7 (2016): 370-392; James Gump, ‘Ecological Change and Pre-Shakan 
State Formation’, African Economic History 18 (1989): 57-75. 
9 Elizabeth Eldredge, The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom, 1815-1828: War, Shaka and the Consolidation 
of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Matthew Hannaford, ‘The consequences of 
past climate change for state formation and security in southern Africa’ (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Sheffield, 2015) 
10 Tim Maggs, ‘The Iron Age farming communities’, in Andrew Duminy and Bill Guest, (eds.) Natal and 
Zululand from Earliest Times to 1910. A New History, pp. 28-48 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal 
Press, 1989). John Wright, ‘Turbulent times. Political transformation in the North and East’, in 
Carolyn Hamilton et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol. 1. From the Early Times to 
1885, pp. 211-252 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010)  
11 Michael Mahoney, ‘The Zulu kingdom as a genocidal and post-genocidal society, c. 1810 to the 
present’, Journal of Genocide Research 5 (2003): 251–268. Elizabeth Eldredge, The Creation of the 
Zulu Kingdom, 1815-1828: War, Shaka and the Consolidation of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). 
12 This growth in conflict was conventionally termed as the ‘mfecane’ (‘the crushing’), though this 
term is now generally viewed as inseparable from the colonial era paradigm that implicated Shaka 
and the apparent destructive rise of the Zulu Kingdom as the sole cause of conflict, violence and 
migration, which thereby triggered the ‘depopulation’ of entire areas of southeast Africa and paved 
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In addition to changes in social organisation, a prime explanation for societal transformation 
in the Zululand area is responses to climatic change and extremes. Hall was the first to 
hypothesise that trends towards increased rainfall in Zululand from the mid-eighteenth 
century – towards the end of the Little Ice Age – contributed to an increase in agricultural 
productivity, and subsequently population density, as recorded in early traveller’s writings and 
archaeological evidence. Furthermore, Hall, Hedges, Maggs, Huffman and Holmgren and 
Öberg all argue that the adoption of maize as a staple crop at this time of increased rainfall 
aided population growth, as maize has higher yields relative to the formerly dominant staples 
of sorghum and millet. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, a rapid decline 
in annual rainfall culminated in severe, multi-year droughts, which led to what became known 
as the ‘mahlatule famine’ – remembered in oral traditions as the time ‘we were obliged to eat 
grass’ – at the turn of the nineteenth century, and a later protracted drought during the 
1820s.13 Hannaford et al. note that as these droughts impacted upon transformed 
vulnerability contexts, the severity of their impacts were likely to have been unprecedented. 
In particular, increased dependence on maize, which is more sensitive to water-deprivation 
than sorghum, together with a growing population, meant that local subsistence agriculture 
was more vulnerable than in previous droughts. Food shortages were, therefore, reached at 
an earlier stage of a prolonged drought, forcing a reliance on wild food resources (see 
Hannaford and Nash for a discussion).14 
                                                          
the way for settler expansion. It has become clear, however, that heightened conflict at this time has 
its roots in the changes that emerged from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, rather than the rise 
of Shaka’s Zulu Kingdom. For more on the mfecane debate, see Julian Cobbing, ‘The Mfecane as Alibi: 
Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo’, The Journal of African History 29 (1988): 487-519; Carolyn 
Hamilton, The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History 
(Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995); John Omer-Cooper, ‘Has the Mfecane a 
future? A Response to the Cobbing Critique’, Journal of Southern Africa Studies, 19 (1993): 273-294; 
Norman Etherington, The Great Treks: The Transformation of Southern Africa 1815-1854 (Harlow: 
Pearson Education Limited, 2001); Alan Smith, ‘Delagoa Bay and the Trade of South-Eastern Africa’, 
in Richard Gray and David Birmingham (eds.), Pre-Colonial African Trade, pp. 265-289 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1970); David Hedges, ‘Trade and politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries’ (Ph.D. diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London, 1978); John Wright, ‘Turbulent times. Political transformation in the North and 
East’, in Carolyn Hamilton et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol. 1. From the Early 
Times to 1885, pp. 211-252 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010); Thomas Huffman, ‘The 
archaeology of the Nguni past’, Southern African Humanities 16 (2004): 79-111; Elizabeth Eldredge, 
’Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa, c. 1800–30: The ‘Mfecane’ Reconsidered’, Journal of African 
History 33 (1992): 1-35; John Wright, ‘Turbulent times. Political transformation in the North and 
East’, in Carolyn Hamilton et al. (eds.) The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol. 1. From the Early 
Times to 1885, pp. 211-252 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Jeffrey Peires, ‘Paradigm 
deleted: The Materialist interpretation of the Mfecane’, Journal of Southern African Studies 19 
(1993): 295-314. Carolyn Hamilton, ’Restructuring within the Zulu royal house’, African Studies 56 
(1997): 85-113. 
13 Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, ’Evidence of Lunguza ka Mpukane,’ in Colin de B. Webb and 
John Wright, (eds.) The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence relating to the History of the 
Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples, 6 vols., pp. 342 (Durban: Killie Campbell Africana Library, 1986). 
14 Martin Hall, ’Dendroclimatology, rainfall and human adaption in the later Iron Age of Natal and 
Zululand,’ Annals of the Natal Museum 22 (1976): 693-703; Tim Maggs, ‘The Iron Age farming 
communities’, in Andrew Duminy and Bill Guest, (eds.) Natal and Zululand from Earliest Times to 
1910. A New History, pp. 28-48 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1989). David Hedges, 
‘Trade and politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
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Interpretations of societal responses to the mahlatule famine and the droughts of the 1820s 
vary. One line of reasoning put forward by Ballard argues that the subsistence crisis during the 
famine led to a breakdown of governance and the normal functioning of society in the Nguni-
speaking chiefdoms, resulting in increased migration, raiding and violence as people sought 
food, security and protection from predatory groups. In turn, Ballard concludes that the 
resultant turmoil led to the development of a new social order and defensive state formation 
among the larger Mthethwa and Ndwandwe groups, the former of which was superseded by 
Shaka’s Zulu kingdom.15 
Eldredge, on the other hand, considers the interaction of climatic and political-economic 
changes as the main instigator of societal transformation. Cautious of promoting simplistic 
mono-causal explanations, Eldredge suggests that a complex interaction between factors such 
as reduced rainfall, severe drought, increasing socio-economic inequalities and 
marginalisation were principal stimuli for political formation in the early-nineteenth century. 
In this thesis, increasing political consolidation and socio-economic stratification resulting 
from responses to new trade opportunities in the late-eighteenth century produced 
inequalities in access to resources both within and between chiefdoms. This amplification of 
inequalities subsequently led to the breakdown of traditional strategies of averting famine, 
meaning the droughts of the early-nineteenth century resulted in severe and widespread 
famine. In contrast to Ballard, however, Eldredge notes that increased political centralisation 
and state formation in the first two decades of the nineteenth century reflected a process of 
diplomatic incorporation of people, land and resources into those chiefdoms that were more 
resilient to climatic stress, such as the Mthethwa polity, rather than a widespread breakdown 
in governance. Hannaford et al. are sympathetic to Eldredge’s multidimensional approach and 
propose an interactive model that recognises both the non-linearity of complex systems and 
human agency as key to understanding the interactions between past climate variability and 
human activity.16  
By the second decade of the nineteenth century, the smaller Zulu polity was under the rule of 
Senzangakona – Shaka’s father – and was subordinate to Dingiswayo’s Mthethwa chiefdom, 
while Shaka was gaining his reputation as a soldier. Upon Senzangakona’s death in 1816, 
Dingiswayo installed Shaka as Zulu chief; when Dingiswayo was killed in 1817 as the 
                                                          
centuries’ (Ph.D. diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1978); Thomas 
Huffman, ‘Archaeological evidence for climatic change during the last 2000 years in southern Africa’, 
Quaternary International, 33 (1996): 55-60; Karin Holmgren and Helena Öberg, ‘Climate change in 
southern and eastern Africa during the past millennium and its implications for societal 
development’, Environment, Development and Sustainability 8 (2006): 185-195; Matthew Hannaford 
et al., ‘Climate Variability and Societal Dynamics in Pre-Colonial Southern Africa History (AD 900-
1840): A Synthesis and Critique’, Environment and History 20 (2014): 411-445. Matthew Hannaford 
and David Nash, ‘Climate, history, society over the last millennium in southeast Africa’, WIREs 
Climate Change, 7 (2016): 370-392. See also J. B. Mcl. Daniel, ’A Geographical Study of Pre-Shakan 
Zululand’, The South African Geographical Journal 55 (1973): 23-31. 
15 Charles Ballard, ‘Drought and Economic Distress: South Africa in the 1800s’, The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, 17 (1986): 359-387. The Nguni family of Bantu-speaking people who later 
formed the Zulu kingdom probably migrated into south-eastern Africa in the early-second millennium 
AD. They were predominantly pastoralists practicing shifting cultivation, see Thomas Huffman, ‘The 
archaeology of the Nguni past’, Southern African Humanities 16 (2004): 79-111. 
16 Elizabeth Eldredge, ‘Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa, c. 1800–30: The ‘Mfecane’ 
Reconsidered’, Journal of African History 33 (1992): 1-35; Matthew Hannaford et al., ‘Climate 
Variability and Societal Dynamics in Pre-Colonial Southern Africa History (AD 900-1840): A Synthesis 
and Critique’, Environment and History 20 (2014): 411-445. 
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Mthethwa-Ndwandwe conflict reached its climax, it was Shaka who reunited the defeated 
Mthethwa and continued the incorporation and subordination of neighbouring chiefdoms 
into a centralised political unit that grew into the Zulu Kingdom. According to Deflem, Shaka 
enhanced the amabutho system and disciplined the army from the ideas of Dingiswayo, and 
both military innovations and diplomatic intervention allowed Shaka to expand his influence 
over much of the area between the Pongola and Tugela rivers (Figure 1). The Zulu Kingdom 
was highly stratified, with homesteads spread over hills and ridges all over the country, 
forming the basic production units. The King exercised authority over these homesteads, 
extracting surplus from them, and uniting them administratively into one large centralised 
political entity. All men reaching the age of puberty now had to serve in the Zulu army, and 
were gathered into age-sets. Guy notes that each man still had to derive his subsistence from 
his own labour but was also dependent on supplies from their ‘father’ homesteads.17  
Rainmaking and ritual power (1818-1835) 
As the Zulu kingdom grew, an important step taken by Shaka was to violently neutralise the 
powers of Zulu sorcerers, medicine-men and rainmakers (or inyangas). Hamilton and Deflem 
hold that, in this way, the King gained monopoly over supernatural practices, thereby 
extending his authority and strengthening his position as a link to ancestral spirits. By expelling 
all rainmakers from his kingdom, Shaka made it clear that only he could control the heavens. 
According to Gluckman, the religious and supernatural duties of the king were vested in the 
office of the kingship, so that the king’s successor took over these duties. However, Shamase 
notes that, during Shaka's reign, loyalty was to the King as a person, not to the monarchy itself, 
while for later Kings the loyalty was to the institution of the monarchy.18 
Hovland and Parrinder note that the King’s ritual role in producing rain was held to be an 
important part of the powerbase in the Zulu Kingdom, and can be traced back to efforts made 
by Shaka to embody these powerful institutions under the King’s domain. According to Weir, 
Shaka enhanced his power by calling on ancestors through dreams, to acquire powerful 
medicines and to make rain. When subordinating neighbours, Shaka also annexed the 
medicine and rainmaking skills of the defeated groups. In doing so, he removed the ritual 
power of the chiefs and centralised authority over the spiritual sphere as a part of social and 
political restructuring. Those who were seen as ritually powerful enough to threaten the 
Kingship would be killed.19 
                                                          
17 Mathieu Deflem, ‘Warfare, Political Leadership, and State Formation: The Case of the Zulu 
Kingdom, 1808-1879’, Ethnology 38 (1999): 371-391. Jeff Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: 
The Civil War, 1879-1884, (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1994).  
18 Carolyn Hamilton, ’Restructuring within the Zulu royal house’, African Studies 56 (1997): 85-113. 
Mathieu Deflem, ‘Warfare, Political Leadership, and State Formation: The Case of the Zulu Kingdom, 
1808-1879’, Ethnology, 38 (1999): 371-391. Max Gluckman, ‘The Kingdom of the Zulu of South 
Africa’, in Meyer Fortes and Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, (eds.) African Political Systems, pp. 25-56 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Max Gluckman, ‘The individual in a Social Framework: The 
Rise of King Shaka of Zululand’, Journal of African Studies 1 (1974): 113-144. Maxwell Shamase, ‘The 
reign of King Mpande and his relations with the Republic of Natalia and its successor, the British 
Colony of Natal’ (Ph.D diss., University of Zululand, 1999), 3. 
19 Ingie Hovland, Mission Station Christianity. Norwegian Missionaries in Colonial Natal and Zululand, 
Southern Africa 1850-1890, (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Geoffrey Parrinder, African Traditional Religion. 
Third edition, (London: Sheldon Press, 1974); Jennifer Weir, ‘Whose Unkulunkulu?’, Africa 75 (2005): 
203-219. 
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Callaway’s writings illustrate how Shaka took control over ritual power, including this story of 
a local ‘rain-doctor’: 
...the chiefs of the house of Uzulu used not to allow a mere inferior to be even said 
to have power over the heaven (…) ...Utshaka had said, "Let all the heaven-doctors 
be killed."  
Weir further emphasises that Shaka could not have successfully incorporated surrounding 
groups without controlling and centralising the ‘invisible’ spiritual aspects of power such as 
rainmaking rituals and customs such as the umkosi, or ‘first fruits festival’, which placed tight 
control on the harvesting of grain across the kingdom.20 
After his death in 1828, Shaka was succeeded by his assassinator and half-brother Dingane. 
Although Dingane lacked Shaka’s military skills and exercised a more relaxed discipline, 
Colenbrander notes that the Zulu kingship had acquired widespread political, economic and 
ideological legitimacy, and therefore the transition did not deteriorate the centralised power 
of the kingdom. Deflem describes how Mpande took over the throne in 1840, after having 
allied with the Voortrekkers and conspired in the killing of Dignane. Mpande ruled for 32 years, 
and after his death of old age he was formally succeeded by Cetshwayo in 1873, who became 
ruler of a ~300,000-strong population. Although some 44 years separated Shaka’s rule from 
that of his nephew, Guy and Shamase hold that many of the features of Shaka’s reign could 
still be recognised under Cetshwayo. In 1879, the Zulu Kingdom met its final defeat in the 
Anglo-Zulu War and became subjected to British administration under a variation of indirect 
rule. This included dividing the kingdom into thirteen territories under appointed chiefs. Three 
years later the Zulu territory was made a British protectorate, and in 1897 it became part of 
the Natal Colony.21 
 
Droughts and social unrest in the mid- to late-nineteenth century 
1835-1872: ‘Nailing the ground’  
An analysis of the climate history of Zululand and Natal by Nash et al., conducted in parallel 
with this study, reveals that southeast Africa experienced severe or multi-year droughts on 
eight separate occasions between 1836 and 1900 (Figure 2, Table II). In line with investigations 
in other parts of southern Africa conducted by Nash and Endfield, Kelso and Vogel, and Nash 
and Grab, the most severe of these dry spells was the drought of 1861-63 and the most 
                                                          
20 Henry Callaway was a missionary for the Church of England to South Africa. He studied Zulu 
religious beliefs and other customs and was among the first to publish books on the subject, see 
Henry Callaway, The Religious System of the Amazulu, p. 390 (Springvale: John A. Blair, 1870), (Digital 
version; digitized by the Internet Archive in 2010 with funding from Indiana University). Jennifer 
Weir, ‘Whose Unkulunkulu?’, Africa, 75 (2005): 203-219. 
21 Peter Colenbrander, ‘The Zulu Kingdom, 1828-79’, in Andrew Duminy and Bill Guest, (eds.) Natal 
and Zululand from Earliest Times to 1910. A New History, pp. 83-115 (Pietermaritzburg: University of 
Natal Press, 1989); Mathieu Deflem, ‘Warfare, Political Leadership, and State Formation: The Case of 
the Zulu Kingdom, 1808-1879’, Ethnology 38 (1999): 371-391. Jeff Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu 
Kingdom: The Civil War, 1879-1884, (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1994). Maxwell 
Shamase, ‘The reign of King Mpande and his relations with the Republic of Natalia and its successor, 
the British Colony of Natal’ (Ph.D diss., University of Zululand, 1999); Thomas McClendon, White 
Chiefs, Black Lords. Shepstone and the Colonial State in Natal, South Africa 1845-1878 (Rochester: 
University of Rochester Press, 2010). 
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prolonged was that of 1895-1900. Six severe or multi-year wet periods are also recognised, 
the early-1890s being the wettest period of the nineteenth century. The results for 1836-1850 
agree well with a recently published chronology of early-nineteenth century rainfall variability 
for KwaZulu-Natal derived from ships’ logbook data by Hannaford et al.22 
Figure 2: Interannual rainfall variability across former Natal and Zululand for each of the 
austral summer rainy seasons between 1836 and 1900, reconstructed from documentary 
sources. CR indicates the confidence rating for each annual classification, where 3 indicates 
high confidence and 1 low confidence.23 
 
 
Table II: Drought episodes and wetter periods in former Natal and Zululand between 1836 
and 1900, identified from historical sources. 
Climatic condition Rainy seasons affected 
Severe or multi-year dry periods 1836-38, 1861-63, 1865-66, 1868-70, 1876-79, 1883-85, 
1886-90, 1895-1900 
Severe or multi-year wet periods 1847-49, 1854-57, 1863-65, 1879-81, 1890-91, 1892-94 
 
This detailed chronological climatic framework permits us to explore the narratives of social 
upheaval and conflict during selected periods of anomalous weather. The first multi-year 
drought (1836-38) falls prior to the widespread establishment of mission stations across 
Zululand; as a result, we lack detailed local information on societal responses for this event. 
Most of the following 25 years appear to have been relatively wet across the region, with only 
three dry spells identified from historical sources. As these dry periods lasted only one season, 
their impact appears to have been more limited. 
In contrast, both documentary and oral sources describe societal responses to the multi-year 
1861-63 drought. This was termed the ‘Mbete famine’ in Zulu oral evidence after a rain doctor 
named Mbete of the Ngcobo people near the mouth of the Tugela. Oral accounts – in 
                                                          
22 David Nash et al., ‘Annual and seasonal rainfall variability in southeast Africa during the nineteenth 
century reconstructed from documentary sources’, Climatic Change 134 (2016): 605–619. David Nash 
and Georgina Endfield, ‘Splendid rains have fallen: links between El Niño and rainfall variability in the 
Kalahari, 1840-1900’, Climatic Change 86 (2008): 257-290; Clare Kelso and Coleen Vogel, ‘The climate 
of Namaqualand in the nineteenth century’, Climatic Change 86 (2007): 357-380; David Nash and 
Stefan Grab, ‘A sky of brass and burning winds’: Documentary evidence of rainfall variability in 
Lesotho, 1824-1900’, Climatic Change 101 (2010): 617-653. Matthew Hannaford et al., ‘Early-
nineteenth-century southern African precipitation reconstructions from ships' logbooks’, The 
Holocene 25 (2015): 379-390. 
23 For more detail on rainfall variability, see David Nash et al., ‘Annual and seasonal rainfall variability 
in southeast Africa during the nineteenth century reconstructed from documentary sources’, Climatic 
Change, DOI. 
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particular the evidence of Mtshayankomo ka Magolwana – describe the severe impacts of this 
drought upon the land: 
There was a great drought; it was called the drought of Mbete. The land was 
destroyed. The king ordered the people to be sent to ask for rain from Langalibalele 
ka Mtimkulu… The cattle died from lungsickness… the rivers dried up completely. 
Izinongwe plants were dug up and eaten, together with ubogo plants. Wild figs 
were picked, pounded up, and dried.24 
There are very many reports of unrest in the historical documentary records from these years 
as compared with normal or wet periods. The most common form of unrest, reported by both 
British and Norwegian missionaries and James Stuart’s interviewees, is linked to local beliefs 
about rain control. In the archives, we find many descriptions of how people were accused of 
‘nailing the ground’ – usually by driving either wooden pegs or metal nails into hill-tops – to 
prevent rain, thunder or lightning. There are several suggestions that the ‘Natal kafirs’25 or 
‘outsiders’ were responsible for this activity, but local Zulus were also blamed and killed. The 
following quote, from the SPG missionary at Inkandhla, Mr Jones, illustrates how British 
missionaries perceived and reported these incidents: 
Sept 30th [1862]. Arrived here this afternoon from Kwamagwaza... This is a very 
dry season and the people have been looking out long and anxiously for rain. 
Planting is delayed in consequence; and at the present time rain seems to be their 
first and only thought. The [rain] doctors being at fault have laid the blame at the 
Natal Kafirs who were in the country trading, accusing them of nailing the heavens 
by putting wooden pins in the ground at various places all round the land. Impis 
(Commandos) have been ordered and the wooden pins searched for, and, 
according to reports, found. Kafirs caught alone – that is, not in the company of a 
white man – have been seized, bound, roughly treated and hunted out of the 
country. Yet the rain holds up, none comes. On my way, one of the young men 
accompanying me asking said “And you too pray for rain in-the-worshipping?” I 
answered in the affirmative he said in reply “That is good – it is much needed”.26 
The evidence of Bikwayo and James Stuart’s interpreter, Ndukwana, also attributes nailing the 
ground to ‘outsiders’: 
The medicine pegs were driven into the ground by outsiders. In time of drought all 
the inmates of a kraal would go out and hunt in the fields and on the hills for pegs 
driven in by strangers. Anything found would be taken and thrown into a river or 
stream. Pegs will be driven all about the kraal.27 
                                                          
24 Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, ’Evidence of Mtshayankomo ka Magolwana,’ in Colin de B. 
Webb and John Wright, (eds.) The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence relating to the 
History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples, 6 vols., pp. 108-111 (Durban: Killie Campbell Africana 
Library, 1986). 
25 The term Natal kafir (or Natalkaffir/Natalkafir) was used by whites for the indigenous (black) population of 
the Natal Colony. The term is now considered offensive. 
26 USPG E13, Mr. Jones, Inkandhla, 1 December 1862 
27 Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, ‘Evidence of Bikwayo’, in Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, 
(eds.) The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence relating to the History of the Zulu and 
Neighbouring Peoples, 6 vols., p. 69 (Durban: Killie Campbell Africana Library, 1986). 
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A similar report is given by the Norwegian missionary, Rev. Oftebro of the Eshowe mission 
station: 
It has been terrible to hear the Zulus tell about the kaffirs from Natal that has been 
arrested and molested because they have been suspected of, and partly admitted 
to, putting nails in the ground in order to prevent rainfall. It's been very dry, but 
after the kaffirs were taken it has started to rain. This gives the Zulus strength in 
their superstition.28  
The Norwegian missionary, Rev. Wettergreen, of the Entumeni mission, provides further 
details of the method through which rain was supposedly withheld:   
The Zulus have the belief that their rain doctors by the help of their sorcery can 
make rain. Thus the King last year sent for a doctor from Natal by the name of 
Umbete. Umbete arrived and started to grind rain; but before the fruits of 
Umbete’s work could be seen, there were sent for another doctor, by the name of 
Jonas, who also arrived. This insulted Umbete, who swore that the Zulus should 
have to pay. As a revenge, and as it is said, also affected by Umunase, the Natal 
living mother of the fallen prince Umbulazi, has Umbete sent some Natalkaffirs 
over to Zululand with 'izikonkwane'; nails or wooden pegs, that are thumped into 
the ground to prevent rain. These pegs are smudged with a dough of flour, 
wrapped in sugarcane leaves, then some black powder is put on top, and on top of 
that again some red substance; the red is supposed to symbolise that the heaven 
will become hard and red, so that no rain will fall. It is easy to understand that the 
Zulus believe as much in this effect as in rainmaking, and that they punish the ones 
that practise such evil.29 
Rev. Wettergreen also notes that the situation posed great restriction on movement for the 
indigenous population: 
There was a command that all Natalkaffirs, that walked alone without the 
company of a white man, should be tied. As a result many Natalkaffirs were tied 
up and robbed, some killed, though not only due to this reason, but it was not in 
the command from the prince that they should be killed...  The enormous impact 
this has on the connection between the mission stations must be understood. 
People that are in our labour do not dare to walk alone with a letter or a package, 
without the company of a white man, and that counts for both Zulus and 
Natalkaffirs. When they carry a package or a letter they are often seen as being in 
the service of a white man, but in places where they are not well known, they are 
taken for amakafula; Natalkaffirs; and are naturally put under the same torture as 
they are; it does not help to say where they come from or where they are going, in 
a country where all people are liars. We cannot ask our people to run errands when 
we know that they can get tied up.30  
The drought of 1861-63 was followed by two relatively wet years, during which there is no 
mention of social unrest and conflict in our material. However, drought returned in 1865-66, 
                                                          
28 MHS, Mission Archives, A1045-139-12, Rev. Oftebro, Eshowe, 29 October 1862 
29 MHS, Mission Archives, A1045-130-12, Rev. Wettergreen, Entumeni, 27 October 1862 
30 MHS, Mission Archives, A1045-130-12, Rev. Wettergreen, Entumeni, 27 October 1862 
16 
 
and with it several accounts of conflict related to the suspected nailing of the ground. For 
example, Rev. Schreuder of the Entumeni mission reports:  
The summer rain has now started. This year we have also had ‘heaven-nailing’ 
upheavals in the country due to long duration drought. This year has been very 
bloody. The inhabitants of nine farmsteads have been massacred. We have now 
had one week of splendid rain, so we started to hope for better times regarding 
these nailing-incidents, but as long as nailing-lies are about it is not easy to send 
our natives around the country.31 
Two months later, Rev. Larsen of the Inhlasatye mission notes: 
In October we only had 4 small showers. Quite insufficient to soften the hard 
ground. Calling a rainmaker from the colony did not help. Not until November did 
he have success (rain arrived). Thus, we had the same nailing-incident as a few 
years back. But not in the lowland, where it rained well. Several people were killed 
because they were accused of nailing the ground to prevent rain.32 
A similar pattern is reported during the relatively dry rainy season of 1871-72, when the 
Norwegian missionary priest Rev. Gundersen writes that the Zulus have killed a rain-doctor by 
“...tying him to a log and throwing him into the river Tugela, where he was eaten by greedy 
crocodiles...”. Gundersen further notes that 1871-72 was a particularly violent year, during 
which an executioner was sent to four farmsteads, with several people killed at each locality33. 
In addition to the murders and molestations, we can also read from the letters that Zulus are 
banned from travelling during droughts, unless in the presence of a white person. If travelling 
alone they risked accusations of being ‘Natal-Kaffirs’ with intentions of ‘nailing the ground’. 
There is evidence, however, of the ban being ignored in some parts of the country, as 
Robertson of KwaMagwaza reports: 
I am afraid we are going to have another year of famine. In some Districts the crops 
are an utter failure and the people have dispersed themselves elsewhere in search 
of food. One party has passed this place and I saw another at Entseleni.34 
The preceding empirical evidence suggests that unrest and widespread killings were indirectly 
linked to droughts, primarily through accusations of rain control related to the local belief of 
‘nailing the ground’. To our knowledge, no previous studies have documented the function 
and origin of this practice. However, Berglund’s book, Zulu thought-patterns and symbolism, 
includes a description of a similar practice whereby sharp sticks, protruding stones and 
boulders lying on hills are perceived to hinder rain. Berglund notes “When there is a drought, 
people are sent to remove all upright and protruding sticks and stones, especially on elevated 
hills and mountains”. According to popular belief, this is because they resemble spears 
                                                          
31 Letter by Rev. Hans Schreuder dated 10. November 1865, Entunemi mission station, printed in 
Norsk Missions-Tidene, XXI (1866).  
32 MHS, Mission Archives, A1045-131-3. Rev. Larsen, Inhlasatye, 8 January 1866 
33 MHS, Mission Archives, A1045-132-11, Rev. Gundersen, 4 July 1872 
34 USPG E9a, R. Robertson, Kwamagwaza, 7 April 1862 
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pointing at the heavens, which is a sign of disrespect to the ‘Lord-of-the-sky’. The sticks and 
stones are also suggested to cause fear in the sky, making it afraid to release rain.35 
1872-1900: Narratives of migration and dispersal 
Although it is difficult to pinpoint the precise timing, references to local unrest related to 
accusations of ‘nailing the ground’ appear to stop after the 1871-72 dry period. Coincidentally, 
this is also the last year of Mpande’s reign. Historical accounts associated with the drought of 
1876-79 are dominated by reports of preparations for the 1879 Anglo-Zulu war, including the 
evacuation of all British, German and Norwegian missionaries from Zululand to the Natal 
colony in 1878. However, after the war, which resulted in the fall of Cetshwayo and the 
annexation of Zululand by the British, missionary narratives of responses to drought shift away 
from accounts of unrest and murder to reports of weakness from hunger, population dispersal 
and the enforced alteration of traditional cultural responses to weather extremes.36  
As an illustration, during the relatively dry rainy season of 1881-82, in place of killings and 
unrest linked to accusations of rain control, we find several references to migration and 
general processes of population dispersal. For instance, the Norwegian missionary Rev. Dahle 
reports from Empangeni that people were migrating from the lowlands to the highlands where 
the drought had been less severe:  
As a consequence of the lack of rain this summer both the kassa and amatabele 
harvest here in the lowland failed. Many people are moving to the highlands where 
the drought has been less severe, where they stay with relatives and friends, others 
are moving to Natal to seek employment, while the ones that stay behind must 
look after the farms and cattle.37 
The British missionary, J.M. Samuelsson, reports similar observations: 
The congregations have been rather small owing to the fact that very many of the 
people had to leave their homes in search of food in other parts of the country.38 
Reports during the multi-year drought of 1883-85 include descriptions of people being too 
hungry to fight. Rev. Oftebro, for example, notes:  
For the time being it is quiet everywhere due to hunger, but the general opinion is 
that as soon as people have enough food there will be war again.39 
The final dry period for which significant documentation is available is the multi-year drought 
of 1895-1900. During this protracted drought, the onset of which is potentially linked to the 
major El Niño event of 1896-97, the region experienced the intertwined factors of low rainfall, 
locusts and cattle plague (rinderpest), which resulted in a severe decline in agricultural 
production. Despite the extent of food and cattle shortages, responses to droughts do not 
appear to be associated with violence or conflict, but rather in the form of population dispersal 
and mass migration, especially rural-urban migration with the growth of wage labour in 
                                                          
35 Axel-Ivar Berglund, Zulu Thought-Patterns and Symbolism, p. 58 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1989). 
36 MHS, Mission Archives, Lower Tugela District, A1045-134-12, Rev. Oftebro, 21 May 1878 
37 MHS, Mission Archives, A1045-135b-4, Rev. Dahle, Empangeni, 10 May 1882 
38 USPG E37, J.M. Samuelson, St Paul’s, Zululand, 1 June 1882 
39 MHS, Mission Archives, A1045-136-11, Rev. Oftebro, 5 January 1885 
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Johannesburg and Durban.40 The Norwegian missionaries, Rev. Braatvedt and Rev. Steenberg, 
for example, provide details of the extent and nature of the out-migration: 
Over a long period we could almost daily witness crowds of men and boys walking 
past, on their way to Natal to search for work. Others – wives and girls – were 
walking to the coast to buy or get some potatoes from their relatives. 
Then a revolution occurred, a radical process of dispersal among the people: quite 
a few went to Natal and Johannesburg to find work in order to make an income for 
their homes; others scattered around the country, partly to beg, partly to find 
temporary shelter to relatives or acquaintances. Most homes contained only few 
people. They were always on the move to somewhere where a little food could be 
obtained, higher places were a bit better off, while lower parts of the country were 
very crowded.41 
The American missionary, Rev. Ransom, further notes: 
Migrations to Durban and Johannesburg have increased, and this year several 
women and girls have been induced to try their fortunes at that Babylon of So. 
Africa – Johannesburg.42 
Subsequent oral evidence from Bikwayo and Ndukwana – interviewed by Stuart in 1903 – also 
reveal important local narratives of an enforced change in traditional responses to drought: 
 
It is a great misfortune [that] natives who can cause rain [are] being directed not 
to attempt to do so. Now we are afraid of the government for it does not allow 
this. We cannot understand this as the government would benefit because their 
trees would grow, and people would be free from hardship, having enough to eat, 
and be better able to pay money. Rain doctors are just those who should not be 
disallowed. Year by year we look to agriculture. We reap and look forward to next 
year’s crops. We depend on what comes out of the ground. We do not preserve or 
store anything. The government keeps us from that occupation [rainmaking], and 
food. The government ought to be considerate in so bad a year as this, and allow 
us to endeavour to find a last way out. If that were allowed there would certainly 
be rain.43 
In summary, over the last three decades of the nineteenth century there was a shift in the 
nature of the response of Zulu populations to single- or multi-year drought episodes. Unrest 
and violence associated with accusations of rain control were replaced, at some point during 
                                                          
40 For more on the 1896-97 El Niño event, see David Nash and Stefan Grab, ‘A sky of brass and 
burning winds’: Documentary evidence of rainfall variability in Lesotho, 1824-1900’, Climatic Change, 
101 (2010): 617-653. Charles Ballard, ’Drought and Economic Distress: South Africa in the 1800s’, 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 17 (1986): 359-387. 
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42 Harvard, Houghton Library, ABC 15.4, vol. 13, Southern Africa, Zulu Mission 1890-99, Charles N. 
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43 Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, ‘Evidence of Bikwayo’, in Colin de B. Webb and John Wright, 
(eds.) The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence relating to the History of the Zulu and 
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the early-mid-1870s, by population dispersal, culminating in large scale migration at the close 
of the century. It is very likely that this came as a result of the imposition of British colonial 
administration. 
Discussion 
Viewing the preceding accounts of drought responses in the light of known political and social 
changes in Zululand during the nineteenth century, an interesting narrative emerges. With the 
caveats that (i) the available historical reports are relatively limited, and (ii) the majority of 
accounts are seen through the eyes of outsiders, it is possible to draw some generalisations 
concerning climatic events and social unrest. There is no doubt that weather, and especially 
periods of excess rainfall/drought, had a major impact upon local subsistence economies in 
southeastern Africa. Hence, weather also played a major role in Zulu social and political 
organisation, control regimes and cultural beliefs. During the early-nineteenth century, there 
are well documented accounts of mass migration, population dispersal and socio-political 
transformation. This was a function of multiple factors, both environmental and societal. The 
droughts of the early-nineteenth century had a major impact on society, due, at least in part, 
to a progressive dependence on maize and heightened inequality within and between 
chiefdoms. Increasing political centralisation in the rule of Dingiswayo and Shaka also entailed 
more tightly enforced laws and military customs. 
As noted earlier, from the mid-1820s up until the Anglo-Zulu war in 1879, King Shaka and his 
successors, made great efforts to gain monopoly over rainmaking, medicine and ritual 
practices, which resulted in the killing and expulsion of traditional rain-doctors. By embodying 
these powerful institutions, the King strengthened and centralised his powerbase and also 
gained greater coercive control over newly subordinate groups. He also placed the kingdom 
at the centre of the supernatural realm and positioned the King in a direct line to divine 
powers. This was, however, a perilous position, since the King risked rebellion if he did not 
deliver rain, as reported elsewhere in southeast Africa by Huffman. Thus, to secure power in 
times of hardship, including droughts, blame was transferred from the royal seat to external 
powers or ‘outsiders’, such as the ‘Natal-Kaffirs’ or local disobedient individuals, who were 
accused of being sorcerers and were thus brutally killed. The myth of the impacts of ‘nailing 
the ground’, similar to other features of Zulu mythology, was actively engaged to divert 
peoples’ frustrations. In this way, the King managed to both give an explanation as to why he 
no longer controlled the skies to the benefit of his people, but also to generate fear of 
questioning the authority of the Kingdom. It is, of course, possible to interpret the act of 
‘nailing the ground’ as representing one facet of the conflict between the Zulu Kingdom and, 
for instance, royal heirs that took refuge in Natal (as described by Rev. Wettergreen above). 
The employment of such ‘supernatural warfare’ by rival groups would have been perceived 
by Zulu powers as a real threat, and provided a strong incentive for the use of brutal force 
against apparent (and real) enemies of the state.44  
Another noteworthy aspect reported by missionaries in the mid-nineteenth century is that 
people were prohibited  to travel during droughts, unless in the presence of a white person, 
because they then could be accused of being ‘Natal-Kaffirs’ with intentions of ‘nailing the 
ground’ or regarded as accomplices to such crimes. Although this ban was not recognised in 
all parts of Zululand, it had the effect of constraining potential rebellion against the king for 
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failing to deliver rain. In addition, population dispersals and mass migrations – previously 
common responses to those worst affected by and least able to cope with droughts – were 
effectively hindered through the ban on travel.  
A further striking feature from the historical record is that the accounts of accusations of 
‘nailing the ground’ apparently end around the death of Mpande. After the Anglo-Zulu war, 
and the subsequent annexation of Zululand by the British, we find no report of such 
accusations, nor any references to explanations for drought associated with this practice. This 
strengthens the suggestion that such accusations were used for political gain, and to secure 
the power of the King in times of distress. Following the establishment of indirect British rule, 
the power balance in Zululand was disrupted and the Zulu Kingdom lost its aura of invincibility 
and divinity. The implications of this power-shift are most striking in the descriptions of the 
protracted droughts towards the end of the nineteenth century. Instead of reports of rain 
control, which might be expected based on material from the mid-1900s, there are no such 
references from this period. Rather, we find narratives of the mass dispersal of people, 
described as a revolution by missionaries, including both local movements from the coast to 
inland areas, and also longer migrations to urban centres and other parts of the country. This 
mirrors the way in which populations reacted to large-scale subsistence crises prior to the 
establishment of the Zulu Kingdom. Seen through this lens, we view the killings, molestations 
and incidents of local unrest reported during droughts in the times of the sovereign Zulu 
Kingdom as a coercive means of controlling people and maintaining authority. This 
interpretation offers an explanation for the reports of heightened conflict, unrest and murder 
related to drought years that we have found in historical and oral sources, which contrast 
markedly with contemporary research into climate-unrest relations in Africa such as that 
reported by Adano et al. and Butler & Gates.45  
Climate and conflict in nineteenth century Zululand: some conclusions 
At the beginning of this paper we questioned how conflict and climate coincide, and whether 
there is support for the hypothesis that extreme or anomalous weather leads to greater 
unrest. We have addressed these issues through primary examination of the historical case of 
later-nineteenth century Zululand. In our historical records there is an overrepresentation of 
reports of local conflict, killings and unrest in many dry or drought years. However, since some 
very dry periods are associated with violence (most notably those during the early- and mid-
nineteenth century), whilst those of the latter nineteenth century are not, it is necessary to 
look more closely at the contextual socio-political framing of these conflicts. In line with 
Butzer, we find that the potential for conflict, unrest and violence during or after extreme 
weather events is strongly related to the roles of leaders, elites, and ideologies.46  
Although droughts might be associated with periods of violence and unrest, as occurred 
during the 1860s under the rule of Mpande, they may also be associated with mass migration 
and the transformation of socio-political structures, as occurred in the early-nineteenth 
century and under British rule at the end of the century. These outcomes are contingent upon 
the role of leaders and local power structures, and the willingness and ability of leaders to 
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yield this power. It must also be noted that these droughts occur under variable demographic 
and agricultural conditions; in particular, higher populations and concentrations of both 
people and livestock were present in the region during the 1890s compared to the 1860s. In 
addition, and as Ballard describes, the 1890s witnessed the combination of multiple stresses 
in the form of drought, cattle plague and locust outbreaks. This may, when juxtaposed with 
the lack of the political control-mechanisms earlier employed by the independent Zulu 
Kingdom, and the new colonial British policy that, according to McClendon, encouraged 
migration, have amplified the dispersal process. Overall, the case of nineteenth century 
Zululand illustrates the complexity of interactions between climate, society and culture, and, 
echoing authors such as Gleditsch and Gemenne et al., strengthens the need for a thorough 
scrutiny of the narratives of unrest and conflict in specific socio-cultural contexts.47   
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